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Monetary policy approaches and implementation 
in Asia: the Philippines and Indonesia 
Roberto S Mariano and Delano P Villanueva
1 
“For those emerging market economies that do not choose a policy of 
‘permanently’ fixing the exchange rate - perhaps through a currency board or 
dollarization, the only sound monetary policy is one based on the trinity of a 
flexible exchange rate, an inflation target, and a monetary rule.” (Italics in the 
original, Taylor, (2000).) 
I. Introduction 
The last 15 years have seen extensive use of monetary policy approaches that are rules-
based, but with considerable judgments factored in.
2 This invited paper is about current 
monetary policy approaches and implementation in the Philippines and Indonesia. For each 
of these two countries, the paper attempts to address the following list of issues: 
•  What are the objectives/intermediate targets/instruments? 
•  How are these determined? Are institutional arrangements appropriate to ensure 
that the stated objectives are achieved? Is the central bank independent? De facto 
as well as de jure? 
•  Do the deeds of the central banks correspond to their words? For instance, do 
estimates of reaction functions or other measures of the actual actions of the central 
bank correspond to what it claims to be doing? 
•  What provides the nominal anchor in the country? How are the issues of fiscal 
dominance and exchange rate dominance dealt with? 
•  How effectively does the central bank communicate with the public? By what 
means? Do readily available reports and a website provide adequate information? 
Section II describes recent trends in monetary policy. Section III addresses the five issues 
listed above. We describe for the Philippines and Indonesia the evolution of the monetary 
policy of the monetary policy transmission process as financial development progressed and 
external conditions changed over time. We also discuss the effects of these factors on the 
monetary policy implementation strategy. Section IV concludes. 
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II. Preliminaries:  modern monetary policy 
Taylor (1998) enumerates five broad macroeconomic principles that underpin modern 
monetary policy. This core of macroeconomic principles provides the rationale behind all the 
structural econometric models that have been estimated or calibrated to evaluate monetary 
policy. 
The first principle is stated by the neoclassical growth theory: long-run per capita GDP 
growth is a function of capital intensity and technology, which are both endogenous functions 
of economic policy. The second and third principles, respectively, are that in the long run 
there is no trade-off between inflation and unemployment, but that in the short run there is 
such a trade-off. Whether the short-run trade-off is due to sticky prices, cost shocks or 
imperfect information is an open issue. The second and third principles imply that although 
monetary policy is neutral in the long run, it can have powerful effects on unemployment in 
the short run. The quantitative effect is an open issue, depending on the theoretical 
reasoning behind the impact effect. 
The fourth principle is that people’s expectations about the economy affect the evaluation of 
monetary policy, and these expectations are endogenous to monetary policy changes (and to 
other policy changes). Optimal monetary policy is endogenous to underlying institutions and 
the behaviour of economic agents. 
The fifth principle is implied by the first four: the central bank should announce a target 
inflation rate and describe a rule to be followed such that inflation will remain close to the 
target. It is not enough to target inflation or engage in inflation targeting.
3 
Research on monetary policy rules has focused on the United States and other developed 
countries, whose debt and foreign exchange markets are very deep and sophisticated. 
Rules-based monetary policy is now increasingly being used in emerging market economies, 
and the question is being raised as to what modifications need to be made for the 
effectiveness of modern monetary policy in those economies. Taylor (2000) lists five issues: 
(1)  What is the appropriate instrument in the policy rule? (2) What is the appropriate 
specificity in the policy rule? (3) What is the relationship of the policy rule to inflation 
targeting? (4) What are the implications of underdeveloped long-term bond markets for the 
choice of a policy rule? (5) What is the role of the exchange rate in the policy rule? 
1.  What is the appropriate instrument in the policy rule? 
Taylor (2000) mentions velocity uncertainty as ruling in favor of the interest rate instrument. 
While the interest rate is most commonly used by the central banks of industrial countries, its 
usage is not universal. In the United States and other developed countries, a short-term 
interest rate (in the United States, it is the federal funds rate; at the ECB, it is the rate of the 
main refinancing operations, MROs). The Philippines uses the overnight repurchase rate 
(RP) and reverse repurchase rate (RRP), complemented by open market operations, reserve 
requirements and rediscounting. Taylor (2000) also lists the following factors favouring the 
use of a monetary aggregate instrument: (i) the measurement of the real interest rate is 
difficult; and (ii) there are large shocks to investment or net exports. If the interest rate is 
used under conditions of uncertainty about the equilibrium real interest rate, policy errors are 
                                                  
3  This principle implies that nominal income targeting is not a policy rule in the absence of a process by which 




4 Indonesia used base money until July 2005, after which it shifted to the Bank 
Indonesia interest rate.
5 
2.  What is the appropriate specificity in the policy rule? 
A common misconception is that policy rules are applied mechanically. True, such rules are 
often expressed as algebraic expressions; as such, they can be subject to econometric 
evaluation. Nevertheless, policy rules are generally used as policy frameworks or guidelines 
and in practice are not followed mechanically.
6 Discretion is exercised when examining data 
on prices, industrial output and other variables in order to forecast the current inflation rate 
and the real output gap (real GDP measured as deviation from potential GDP). Likewise, 
there are special circumstances when a temporary departure from the policy rules is 
warranted.
7 However, one important specificity of the policy rule is the size of the interest 
rate response to an increase in the inflation rate, as advocated by Taylor: changing the 
interest rate by more than one for one with the inflation rate is consistent with both theoretical 
and empirical research in the United States.
8 The stable inflation episode in the United 
States in the 1980s and 1990s when the interest rate response was greater than one for one 
contrasts sharply with the high inflation episode in the late 1960s and 1970s when the 
interest rate response was less than one. The response coefficient may be 1.4 or 1.6 and not 
exactly 1.5, but the general point is that, to be an effective policy rule, the response 
coefficient must be greater than one. 
3.  What is the relationship of the policy rule to inflation targeting? 
An inflation target embedded in a good policy rule means an average value for inflation over 
several years.
9 Such an inflation target may, however, be achieved with several policy rules 
that involve larger fluctuations in other important variables such as the exchange rate and/or 
real output. Therefore, one needs to specify a monetary rule and to choose one that 
minimises the standard deviation of real output and inflation from their desired values. 
Whether there should be weights placed on exchange rate stabilisation, interest rate 
stabilisation or something else is open to debate. Trade-off exists among these deviations, 
and a good policy rule assists the policymaker in choosing the point on this trade-off.
10 
                                                  
4  In countries with very high inflation rates and high and variable risk premia, the real interest rate is hard to 
measure. In addition, at any moment in time, emerging market economies are unlikely to be in their steady 
state, being continuously buffeted by exogenous shocks of all sorts; accordingly, the steady state or 
equilibrium real interest rate is difficult to determine and measure.  
5  Singapore uses the trade-weighted nominal exchange rate index (TWI) as the policy instrument, reflecting the 
argument “that in the small and open Singapore economy, the exchange rate is the most effective tool in 
maintaining price stability”; Monetary Authority of Singapore (2001). For an estimate of the policy reaction 
function for Singapore, see Parrado (2004). 
6  See Bernanke (2004) for a discussion on forecast-based and simple policy rules. 
7  For example, the 1987 stock market tumble prompted the US Federal Reserve to temporarily lower interest 
rates by providing liquidity, at a time when the pre-1987 monetary policy was one of raising interest rates, to 
which the Fed returned following the resolution of the liquidity crisis. This framework is consistent with the risk 
management approach espoused by Greenspan (2005). The challenge is to reconcile a forecast-based 
targeting regime with the risk management approach. One can argue that Singapore’s approach is such an 
example. 
8  The Taylor response coefficient is 1.5. 
9  For example, a target mean value of 2% with a 1% standard deviation anywhere from six quarters to 
three years.  
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4.  What are the implications of underdeveloped long-term bond markets for the 
choice of a policy rule? 
Inflation targeting is an alternative to a currency board or to dollarisation. Some discussions 
on inflation targeting (eg in Indonesia) suggest that inflation targeting is an alternative 
framework to monetary targeting. In Indonesia, with difficulties associated with the interest 
rate as an instrument, the previous practice of using reserve money as a policy instrument to 
achieve the inflation target may be more appropriate.
11 
5.  What is the role of the exchange rate in the policy rule? 
Inflation forecast targeting requires a good econometric model and an experienced staff 
(eg  Bank of England) to enable the policymakers to determine how their interest rate 
decisions influence the inflation forecast and thus how close (or far) the inflation forecast will 
be from the target value in the future (say, in four or eight quarters). Owing to the difficulties 
in implementing inflation forecast targeting in many emerging markets, simple monetary 
policy rules using current inflation rates may be the practical alternative to inflation forecast 
targeting.
12 Simple targeting can also be a stepping stone to inflation forecast targeting. 
Expectations of future changes in the policy instrument affect financial markets and the rest 
of the economy. For those monetary policy approaches that use the interest rate as the 
policy instrument, expectations of future short rates influence long rates right away via term 
structure effects. Thus, because monetary policy rules affect expectations, the explicit use of 
a monetary policy rule is a more critical decision than any change in the chosen policy 
instruments.
13 The other implication of expectations effects is the inertial response of the 
policy instrument to the inflation and output gap; such a slow adjustment of the policy 
instrument increases the responsiveness of forward-looking variables such as long-term 
bonds and exchange rates. 
In countries without liquid and deep financial markets and where term structure effects are 
absent or weak, changes in the exchange rate or land price may influence the private 
sector’s future expectations.
14 Moreover, in countries (eg in the Philippines) where the 
interest rate is used as the policy instrument, and in sharp contrast to situations (eg in the 
United States) where term structure effects are strong, more adjustment in the short-term 
markets must take place. Thus, larger adjustments in the short-term interest rate are called 
for.
15 
While research on developed countries appears to suggest that omitting the exchange rate in 
the policy rule is not critical, it is an important consideration in the policy rule applied to the 
developing countries or in countries that are highly open (such as Singapore). An explicit 
manner in which the exchange rate enters the policy rule is its use as the policy instrument in 
                                                  
11  See footnote 4 for reasons why reserve money may be superior to the interest rate as a policy instrument in 
Indonesia. 
12  This assessment, however, is a bit exaggerated. In the real world, monetary policy rules involving the current 
quarter (year) require at least a one-quarter (one-year) ahead forecast for inflation. 
13  The 1999 Bank of Japan zero interest rate policy “rule” brought expectations of future short rates to zero and 
was consistent with the BoJ’s expansionary thrust of monetary policy. 
14  In Singapore, the development of the government securities market is fairly recent. Singapore being a small 
and highly open economy in which the exchange rate has quantitatively larger effects than the interest rate, 
the policy instrument used is the trade-weighted nominal exchange rate. 
15  Meaning that the response coefficients of the interest rate to the inflation and output gaps should be higher. 
Herein lies the danger when the banking system is fragile - a large increase in the interest rate may lead to 
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the policy reaction function.
16 Another way is that the instrument explicitly places weight on 
the exchange rate when trying to achieve the objectives. The inertial response of the 
exchange rate to the inflation and output gap can be captured by the inclusion of the lagged 
value of the exchange rate on the right-hand side of the policy reaction function.
17 
III. The  main  issues 
A. The  Philippines 
The evolution of the monetary policy approach and implementation 
From the birth of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) in 1993 until the adoption of formal 
inflation targeting (IT) in 2002, the BSP employed the IMF monetary programming 
framework. Actually, monetary programming had been used since 1984 when the then 
Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP) shifted to a floating exchange rate regime. 
More  precisely, the monetary policy framework revolved around base or reserve money 
programming. This monetary policy approach was consistent with the IMF financial 
programming module of a tight linkage among money, real GDP and inflation, given 
forecasts of income velocity or the demand for real money balances.
18 As Guinigundo (2005) 
suggests, the shift from monetary programming to IT can be explained more in terms of 
instability in the income velocity of money and the structural break in the positive relationship 
between money and inflation, particularly in short periods of time, such as in 1994 and 1995 
when historically rapid growth rates of money supply and a deceleration of inflation were 
observed. 
In the second half of 1995, rigid observance of money targets gave way to inflation targets. 
As long as inflation was below or at the target level, the BSP tolerated money supply in 
excess of the programmed level. At the same time, the BSP looked at a wide array of 
economic and financial variables in making monetary policy decisions. Nonetheless, the 
semi-IT framework was based on current inflation, as opposed to forecast inflation.
19 
In addition, the new Central Bank Act of 1993 (Republic Act No 7653) assigned price stability 
as the objective of monetary policy and empowered the BSP as the sole formulator and 
executor of monetary policy. The new Act also imposed limits on the amount and maturity of 
BSP credits to the national government, with the intended effect of minimising fiscal 
dominance. 
                                                  
16  The exchange rate affects both inflation and output gap via effects on net exports, on domestic prices through 
import price pass-through, and on interest rates (through interest rate parity). 
17  See Parrado (2004) for the estimation of such a policy reaction function for Singapore. 
18  The IMF financial programming and policy (FPP) is under revision, beginning with the 1998 programme with 
Brazil following that country’s adoption of IT and a flexible exchange rate regime. Note that the standard IMF 
FPP assumes a fixed exchange rate, exogenous capital flows, and a prominent role of the money supply in 
the inflation process. The standard ceiling on net domestic assets (NDA) of the banking system and a floor on 
net international reserves (NIR) are typical quantitative performance criteria in any IMF-supported adjustment 
program. In the case of the 1998 Brazilian arrangement, in the sixth review of November 2000, the ceiling on 
NDA was dropped. With direct IT, a value of NDA in excess of the ceiling did not present any difficulties as 
long as the inflation outcome was on target and the understanding on the NIR was met. Included in the policy 
understandings was a consultation clause on the implementation of the IT framework, with a specific 
numerical path for the inflation rate. 
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The Monetary Board, the monetary policymaking body of the BSP, formally adopted IT in 
January 2000, and its implementation came two years later in January 2002. The average 
inflation targets (in per cent), respectively, for 2002-07 are: 
 
Year Targets  Actual 
2002 3-4 3.0 
2003 3-4 3.5 
2004 4-5 6.0 
2005 5-6   




The actual inflation rates for the first two years of IT (2002 and 2003) were lower than the 
targets, reflecting falling food prices and restrained monetary policy. However, for exactly the 
opposite reasons, rising food and energy prices contributed 4 percentage points of the 6% 
average inflation rate in 2004. When inflation forecasts by the BSP suggested higher than 
targeted inflation in 2004 and 2005 owing mainly to supply side factors, the BSP informed the 
public via press releases, the Quarterly Inflation Report, press conferences and public 
briefings of the reasons for those breaches of the targets as well as the policy measures 
undertaken by the BSP in the light of its forecast of subdued inflation by 2006, downside 
risks to economic activity, and long and variable lags (15-21 months) in the effects of 
monetary policy on inflation.
21 
The issues 
1.  What are the objectives/intermediate targets/instruments? 
The BSP’s main responsibility is to formulate and implement policy in money, banking and 
credit, with the primary objective of maintaining stable prices conducive to balanced and 
sustainable economic growth. The BSP also aims at promoting and preserving monetary 
stability and the convertibility of the Philippine peso. 
The BSP uses the consumer price index (CPI) or headline inflation, published by the National 
Statistics Office, as its monetary policy target, expressed as a range for a given year and set 
by the national government in coordination with the BSP. 
The BSP uses the overnight repurchase rate (RP) and reverse repurchase rate (RRP) as the 
main instrument of monetary policy. This is complemented by open market operations, the 
minimum legal reserve requirements, and rediscounting. 
Some outside analysts have observed that the BSP’s actions on tiering make the policy rate 
less transparent, since the effective RRP rate will differ from the “headline” policy rate when 
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announced a target for 2007. 
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the tiering scheme is in place.
22 However, the market players themselves generally 
understand why the BSP occasionally resorts to the tiering scheme. With tiering, the BSP 
discourages banks from parking their excess funds with the BSP and encourages them to 
lend such funds to clients instead. The BSP’s interpretation of IT appears to be of the flexible 
variety. 
Generally speaking, the 91-day treasury bill rate tends to respond directly to changes in the 
RRP/RP rates, with other market interest rates subsequently following suit. Of late, however, 
there appears to be some divergence between these rates, since the T-bill rate has 
continued to trend down (or remain low) despite the recent increases in the policy interest 
rates. It appears that the banks still prefer holding T-bills to placing their funds in the RRP 
window, because the T-bills are easily tradable. Consequently, the T-bill auctions continue to 
attract excess bids, and primary T-bill rates continue to be low. 
2.  How are the objectives determined? Are institutional arrangements appropriate to 
ensure that the stated objectives are achieved? Is the central bank independent? 
De facto as well as de jure? 
The inflation target is set by the national government (NG), and the target-setting process is 
based largely on the existing framework for coordination among economic agencies under 
the Development Budget Coordinating Committee (DBCC), an inter-agency body tasked 
mainly with overseeing the overall budgetary thrusts of the NG. The DBCC, in coordination 
with the BSP, sets the annual targets for macroeconomic variables, particularly GNP and 
GDP growth and inflation, which are important inputs in the formulation of the revenue, 
expenditure and financing programmes of the NG. The BSP announces the inflation target 
and is accountable for conducting monetary policy consistent with the target. 
Although the BSP does not have goal independence (the inflation target is set by the NG), it 
does have operational and instrument independence. The BSP solely decides on the setting 
of the policy instrument. The BSP also enjoys both fiscal and administrative autonomy under 
Republic Act No 7653, which very clearly specifies limits on the amount and tenor of any 
liquidity assistance by the BSP to the NG. The BSP may provide assistance to the NG in the 
form of provisional advances, but the amount of such advances is limited in terms of both 
duration and amount. Section 89 of RA No 7653 states that “the BSP may make direct 
provisional advances with or without interest to the National Government to finance 
expenditures authorized in the annual appropriation: provided that such provisional advances 
shall not, in their aggregate, exceed 20 percent of the average annual income of the National 
Government for the last three (3) preceding fiscal years”. These advances must be repaid 
“before the end of three (3) months, extendable by another three (3) months as may be 
allowed by the Monetary Board following the date the National Government received such 
provisional advances”. 
RA No 7653 focuses on price stability as the overriding objective of the BSP and makes no 
mention of growth or any other objective pertaining to the real sector. In addition, the BSP’s 
administrative autonomy is guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution. In contrast to the old 
Monetary Board that was dominated by public sector representatives, the new and current 
Monetary Board is composed of the Governor, one Cabinet member and five private sector 
representatives. 
An Advisory Committee (AC) was created by the BSP to make recommendations to the 
Monetary Board on monetary policy. The AC consists of: (1) the BSP Governor (Chairman); 
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(2) the Deputy Governor of the Monetary Stability Sector; (3) the Deputy Governor of the 
Supervision and Examination Sector; (4) the Director of the Treasury Department; and 
(5) the Director of the Department of Economic Research. The AC meets every four weeks 
and held its first meeting on 15 January 2002, when it recommended reductions in BSP 
policy interest rates and in the liquidity reserve requirement ratio. 
3.  Do the deeds of the central bank correspond to its words? For instance, do 
estimates of reaction functions or other measures of the actual actions of the central 
bank correspond to what it claims to be doing? 
There are no estimates of the reaction functions. It appears that the policy rule is based on 
forecast inflation and the output gap. The decisions of the Monetary Board concerning the 
stance of monetary policy have been primarily based on the forecast for inflation, along with 
information on the conditions for output and aggregate demand.
23 However, there have been 
instances where excessive volatility in the foreign exchange market has compelled the BSP 
to take action in order to prevent adverse effects on inflation expectations. This has led some 
observers to ask whether the central bank is pursuing dual goals of price and exchange rate 
stability.
24 
For the BSP, however, its mandate is clearly price stability, and under the inflation targeting 
framework it pursues only an inflation target. Inasmuch as exchange rate movements 
generate imported inflation, the BSP believes that policy actions to address exchange rate 
volatility are not inconsistent with the goal of achieving the inflation target. Exchange rates 
figure more prominently in emerging economies given the greater sensitivity of their domestic 
prices to exchange rate movements. 
Monetary action (eg changes in BSP policy interest rates or reserve requirements) to 
address volatility in the foreign exchange market is considered only in cases where the BSP 
believes that there is a significant prospective threat to the inflation target and to inflation 
expectations. In all cases, the primary concern of authorities is the future path of inflation, not 
the value of the currency against the US dollar. 
4.  What provides the nominal anchor in the country? How are the issues of fiscal 
dominance and exchange rate dominance dealt with? 
Republic Act No 7653 provides safeguards against fiscal dominance in the form of 
prescribed limits on the extent of financial assistance that can be provided by the NG.
25 
Exchange rate stabilisation posed some problems for the conduct of monetary policy under 
inflation targeting, given the extent of exchange rate volatility observed over the past few 
years and the need to guide inflation expectations in the face of such volatility. In the end, 
monetary authorities relied on both their judgment and on the information at hand. 
Generally speaking, however, the BSP supports a market-determined level for the exchange 
rate and does not target a specific spot exchange rate against the US dollar. On a day-to-day 
basis, intervention in the spot market is done only to smooth out sharp fluctuations in the 
exchange rate and ensure orderly conditions in the foreign exchange market at all times. 
                                                  
23  The BSP currently employs two inflation forecasting models, one a single equation and the other a multiple 
equation. These models produce monthly forecasts of inflation up to 24 months. The single-equation model is 
based on Mariano (1998). To complement these two models, the BSP is developing an annual structural 
macroeconomic model incorporating the BSP’s view of monetary policy transmission.  
24  See Gochoco-Bautista (2001). 
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5.  How effectively does the central bank communicate with the public? By what 
means? Do readily available reports and a website provide adequate information?
26 
The BSP also publicly documents and explains any breaches of the inflation target. In 
instances where average annual inflation deviates from the targeted band, the BSP Governor 
issues an Open Letter addressed to the President of the Philippines. The  Open Letter 
explains the sources of deviation of actual inflation from the target inflation path and 
measures that will be undertaken to help achieve the desired inflation path over the policy 
horizon. Open Letters to the President were issued on 16 January 2004 and 18 January 
2005. 
The BSP has a number of disclosure and reporting mechanisms to help the public better 
monitor its commitment to achieving the inflation target: 
•  The Quarterly Inflation Report (which serves as a monetary policy statement). 
•  Press releases at the time of interest rate voting (done every four weeks). 
•  The Highlights of the Meeting of the Monetary Board on Monetary Policy (lag of six 
weeks). 
•  Speeches by the Governor and other senior BSP officials - public presentations and 
information campaign. The BSP conducts regular public information presentations 
on inflation targeting in various Philippine cities every month. The BSP also holds 
regular press conferences to explain its inflation outlook and its monetary policy 
response. The Quarterly Inflation Report is launched with a press conference, 
usually on the last Friday of the month following the reference quarter. 
On its website, http://www.bsp.gov.ph/news/2005-10/news-10202005a.htm, the BSP made 
the following announcement: 
“20 October 2005 
BSP Raises Key Policy Rates 
At its meeting today, the Monetary Board decided to increase the BSP’s policy 
interest rates by 25 basis points to 7.5 percent for the overnight borrowing or 
reverse repurchase (RRP) rate and 9.75 percent for the overnight lending or 
repurchase (RP) rate. 
The Monetary Board noted that the latest BSP forecasts, which incorporate more 
recent data on inflation, output and other key variables, indicate a possible 
breach of the inflation target in 2007, due to possible second-round effects 
coming from supply-side pressures. Equally important, the possibility of a 
sustained deviation of the forecast from the target over the policy horizon poses a 
considerable risk to inflation expectations, in that the public may begin to expect 
inflation to remain persistently well above announced government targets. 
Because monetary action normally requires 15-21 months to take full effect on 
inflation, policy measures undertaken now will help address the risks to inflation 
and inflation expectations in the coming year and in 2007. 
                                                  
26  Eichengreen (2005, Ch 8) describes the features of transparency: (i) announce the inflation target; (ii) publish 
inflation forecast and (iii) describe model linking central bank policy instruments to inflation outcomes. If target 
is missed, central bank explains why in its Inflation Report. Central bank and government have discretion over 
inflation targets, but such discretion is constrained by the targets, forecasts, and model that central bank 
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An added concern is the continued rapid growth in domestic liquidity. Available 
data suggest that the financial system remains very liquid despite the recent 
increase in the policy rate and the reserve requirements, and that the additional 
liquidity in recent months has been fueled by both foreign exchange inflows and 
by the deposit generation activities of banks. 
In summary, the Monetary Board believes that the need for a timely response to 
expected pressures, the risk of a sustained breach of the inflation target and the 
continued presence of excess liquidity in the financial system, provide the 
impetus for monetary action. Recent policy moves have contributed to making the 
overall policy stance less accommodative. However, the evidence suggests that 
this action was necessary. This monetary action will not only address the risks to 
inflation and inflation expectations but also clearly demonstrate the BSP’s 
commitment to its price stability mandate.” 
Clearly, the BSP’s exercise of transparency is commendable. In addition to policy change 
announcements, the BSP website that we accessed on 24 October 2005 includes 
descriptions and analyses of IT, highlights of Monetary Board meetings on monetary policy 
issues (25/08/2005), An Official Core Inflation Measure for the Philippines, a Primer on Core 
Inflation, and the BSP Inflation Report (2nd quarter, 2005). 
Impact of higher energy prices 
Very early on when oil prices started going up, the BSP was careful to make clear to the 
public that the inflationary impact of higher oil prices is not something that can be directly 
addressed by monetary policy, since it is a cost-push effect. Over the past year, however, it 
has become obvious that the regime of high oil prices is bound to continue for some time, for 
supply and demand reasons. Thus, the policy concern has shifted to the impact of oil prices 
on inflationary expectations and on wage setting (ie the second-round effects of the oil 
shock). The policy rate increases so far this year were carried out partly to help guide down 
inflationary expectations. 
Fiscal dominance and other issues 
There remains the issue of fiscal dominance. The problem lies in the excessively large 
stocks of public debt and fiscal deficits, the non-performing loans of the banking system, and 
the potential or near insolvency of important state enterprises. The latter involves contingent 
fiscal liabilities that may be difficult to quantify but nevertheless may be fairly substantial. In 
the event, the effectiveness of monetary policy is reduced.
27 In this context, Walsh’s (2003) 
summary presentation of the fiscal theory of the price level is worth mentioning. This 
controversial theory states that the government’s outstanding nominal debt is a major 
determinant of the price level, however independent and committed a central bank may be to 
price stability as the primary goal. The fiscal theory of the price level basically argues that the 
price level is endogenously determined by the fiscal solvency constraint: a widening of the 
fiscal deficit lowers the present value of future government surpluses. Just as a company’s 
stock price falls when future profits are expected to decrease, the real value of government 
debt would decrease when the revenue flows to repay government bond holders are 
expected to decline. For the government’s real debt to decrease, the price level has to go up. 
                                                  
27  The three prerequisites for a successful inflation targeting are: (i) central bank independence; (ii) the absence 
of fiscal dominance; and (iii) the presence of clear transmission channels from monetary policy instruments to 
market-determined interest rates. (i) and (iii) are satisfied. (ii) is problematic particularly because of the large 
contingent fiscal liabilities implied by non-performing loans in the banking system, and the ongoing large fiscal 
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According to the fiscal theory of the price level, it is not the non-interest bearing money but 
the total nominal liabilities including interest bearing notes and future fiscal surpluses that 
matter for price-level determination. In the absence of fiscal discipline, an independent 
central bank such as the BSP cannot guarantee a stable nominal anchor. In other words, for 
the BSP to successfully focus on price stability, there must be a credible commitment on the 
part of the NG to reduce total fiscal deficits by a meaningful amount.
28 
The whole idea behind inflation targeting is that by committing credibly to a low and stable 
inflation target, a central bank could lower inflationary expectations for the future. Fiscal 
dominance makes this impossible, by not allowing the central bank much control over those 
expectations. In simple terms, why would firms lower their inflationary expectations when 
they know that large fiscal deficits and borderline unsustainable external debt positions 
essentially corner the monetary authority into an untenable position? Knowledge of such a 
cornered monetary policy will result in one-sided bets. Remove the twin dangers of 
monetisation of the debt and the risk of creating inflation through devaluation, and inflation 
targeting has a shot. Fiscal authorities can do a lot by signalling deficit reductions in the 
future, especially if backed up by certain institutional moves that can engender credibility. 
The other relevant issue is the health of the domestic banking system. Here, there remains a 
relatively high level of non-performing loans, and the practice of risk management in 
commercial banking and in bank oversight is not yet widespread. Even in a textbook model 
with a redundant banking sector, price stability should not be the only target for central 
banks. The literature is clear on this, but it is unclear on what other variables to have in the 
loss function. But clearly, jacking up interest rates without regard for the damage it may 
cause to financial intermediaries or the big firms that may control the economy may lead to 
perverse effects as described by Blanchard (2004). Also, hiking up interest rates when the 
fiscal side is out of control may generate stagflation. 
The combination of weak financial systems, “threatening fiscal issues” and problems along 
institutional lines means that higher interest rate moves may actually increase inflation (a 
perverse effect), as higher interest rates might actually precipitate a currency crisis by way of 
causing financial collapse. Here, our feeling is that US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, a long-time champion of the risk management approach, or his successor Ben 
Bernanke, a long-time champion of formal inflation targeting, would pound the bully pulpit to 
demand fiscal and structural reforms. Without such reforms, monetary policy can only do so 
much - much like a good jockey on a bad horse. 
While the BSP may be perceived as successful in its IT now, it should be sending a clear 
signal that (a) the fiscal imbalances must be taken care of, (b) structural reforms should 
continue, and (c) financial sector reforms should be pushed ahead aggressively. Without 
these elements, and with the return of global inflation, the BSP may find that its apparent 
successes were a mirage.
29 For inflation targeting emerging market economies, given (i) the 
deflationary force of China’s recent developments, (ii) globalisation and (iii) the increased 
sophistication of modern monetary policy in controlling inflation, the efficacy of IT used in 
small open economies is an open question, ie how to decompose the fall in inflation into what 
is due to global prices versus domestic monetary policy. 
                                                  
28  For the ECB to focus on price stability, the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact restricts member 
countries’ fiscal deficits. Of course, breaches of the fiscal understandings by France and Germany underscore 
the difficulties enforcing fiscal commitments. 
29  Domestic interest rates are much higher than foreign (US) interest rates, reflecting expected exchange rate 
depreciation and risk premia. We conjecture that the expected exchange rate depreciation is closely related to 




What matters for inflation expectations is forecasts of productivity, the exchange rate, 
competitiveness and future government spending. If the Philippines were growing at a fast 
clip with inflation under control, high productivity, a strong peso, and structural and 
institutional reforms all moving along nicely, then the degree to which fiscal deficits and large 
debts would limit the effectiveness of inflation targeting or any other rule-based approach 
could be reasonably small. If those spigots dry up, we could expect to see something like a 
repeat of 1997-98 (when all the skeletons got exposed). 
The United States can run fiscal deficits of 4-5% of GDP right now. Why? This is perceived 
as temporary. Productivity is very high. The US dollar is used as a reserve and invoicing 
currency, and is gaining value against the euro and the yen. The United States has both 
credible monetary policy and a super-sound financial system. Even so, many top monetary 
economists think that the United States is approaching dangerous levels with its current 
account and fiscal deficits. If this much can be said of the United States, what can be said 
about the Philippines? We argue that the large fiscal deficits and unsustainable external debt 
levels mean far riskier scenarios for the Philippines. 
The BSP’s concern with the exchange rate pass-through effects on inflation makes the 
Philippines closer to Singapore. But the procedure and the mechanics are quite different. 
Whereas the Philippines uses the policy interest rates as instruments, Singapore uses a 
trade-weighted basket of currencies and adjusts the nominal exchange rates based on what 




The evolution of the monetary policy approach and implementation
31 
In the past, the framework for conducting monetary policy was based on monetary 
programming using base money as the operational target. This was in conjunction with past 
IMF-supported adjustment programmes wherein base money targets were used as indicative 
targets or as performance criteria, together with the other monetary targets set for the net 
international reserves (NIR) and the net domestic assets (NDA). 
In the mid-to late 1990s, and for similar reasons as in the Philippines, ie instability in velocity 
resulting from global financial innovations and deregulation, the tight link between reserve 
money, on the one hand, and inflation and growth, on the other, became very tenuous. Thus, 
a gradual shift to IT was launched pari passu with greater flexibility in the exchange rate 
(widening the band), with more attention since July 2005 to interest rates as policy 
instruments replacing changes in reserve money. 
During the crisis of 1997, the crawling band exchange rate regime was abandoned, and the 
rupiah was floated. The massive depreciation of the rupiah had dramatic adverse effects on 
the real economy, shrinking real GDP by 13.2% in 1998, collapsing the banking system, and 
leading to corporate bankruptcies and high rates of unemployment. Following this massive 
rupiah depreciation, Bank Indonesia (BI) raised short-term interest rates sharply. This 
combination proved fatal to the banking and real sectors, resulting in more corporate 
bankruptcies and increased non-performing loans in the banking system. 
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Reacting to these developments, BI exercised its lender of last resort function and injected 
massive liquidity into the banking system to prevent bank runs. Reserve money and broad 
money, respectively, increased by 115% and 68% from November 1997 to July 1998. The 
excessive money creation exerted further pressure on the exchange rate, and thus on prices. 
The inflationary impact of money supply expansion and of the rupiah depreciation created a 
vicious cycle that, if left unchecked, threatened to lead to hyperinflation (which Indonesia had 
experienced in the distant past). Therefore, BI decided to reabsorb the excess liquidity in the 
financial system through the active deployment of all the policy instruments at its disposal. 
NDA of the BI were frozen, and a floor on NIR was established as performance criteria under 
an IMF-supported stabilisation programme. In addition, large penalties were imposed on the 
use of the BI discount facility. To minimise adverse selection and moral hazard problems, BI 
imposed ceilings on bank deposit and interbank rates (with the effect of placing ceilings on 
bank lending rates).
32 The 1999 Central Bank Law provided the legal groundwork for BI to 
adopt IT as an alternative monetary policy framework. When the rupiah was floated, Taylor’s 
trinity kicked in, and inflation targeting with a monetary rule was adopted. 
The issues 
1.  What are the objectives/intermediate targets/instruments? 
A major change in the conduct of monetary policy in the aftermath of the crisis was the new 
Bank Indonesia Act (No 23/1999 as amended by Act No 3/2004) that gave full autonomy to 
BI in the formulation and implementation of monetary and banking policies. As stipulated in 
the new Act, the main objectives of BI are to achieve and maintain the stability of the rupiah -
meaning low and stable inflation, and stable exchange rates. Since the beginning of 2000, BI 
has adopted inflation targeting as the monetary policy framework. The monetary policy 
framework is not a formal inflation targeting (IT) framework, but rather one with an explicit 
inflation target. To achieve this target, BI is still using base money as the operational target 
(policy instrument), at the same time monitoring various aggregates as well as interest rates. 
The BI inflation target is based on a “core” CPI. For 2000 and 2001, the target was set for the 
CPI excluding the impacts of government-administered prices and incomes policy. The 
inflation targets were 3-5% for 2000 and 4-6% for 2001. BI produced forecasts of the impacts 
of administered prices and incomes policy on inflation in the order of 2% and 2-2.5%, 
respectively for 2000 and 2001. Adding these two, the BI forecasts for the headline CPI 
inflation were 5-7% and 6-8%, respectively, for 2000 and 2001. For 2002, in the light of 
difficulties in communicating “core” inflation to the public, the (headline) inflation target was 
set in the range of 9-10%. In addition to this annual target, since 2002 BI has announced its 
commitment to bring inflation down to 6-7% within five years as a medium-term target. 
With an amendment to the BI Act in early 2004 and upon BI’s recommendation, the 
government has set annual and medium-term targets for CPI inflation for 2005, 2006 and 
2007 of 6% (±1%), 5.5% (±1%) and 5% (±1%), respectively. These targets were formulated 
in the context of a gradual disinflation process with the objective of achieving over the long 
term a target of 3% that is deemed competitive with rates prevailing in other emerging market 
economies. 
Up to July 2005, the policy instrument used by BI was base money. Owing to the difficulties 
of controlling base money, from July 2005 BI began to use the BI rate as the policy 
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instrument. This is a policy rate determined in the board meeting based mainly on the 
forecasted inflation path. This action completes the transition towards the inflation targeting 
framework. At the moment, the BI rate serves only as a signal of BI monetary policy stance. 
Weekly, BI still auctions SBIs based on an interest target of close to the BI rate. The auction 
results can be different from the BI rate since some of the banks may want to accept rates of 
the auctioned SBIs below the BI rate in order to make sure they can obtain the allocated 
SBIs. However, in recent months the weighted average of SBI rates under the weekly 
auctions has effectively converged to the BI rate. 
2.  Are institutional arrangements appropriate to ensure that the stated objectives are 
achieved? Is the central bank independent? De facto as well as de jure? 
Act No 23/1999 gave the BI independence in both setting the inflation target (goal 
independence) and in conducting its monetary policy (instrument independence). But since 
2004, the new Central Bank Act No 3/2004 empowered the government to set the inflation 
target upon taking into account BI’s recommendation. 
A clear mechanism for accountability and transparency of monetary policy is outlined in the 
new Act. BI is required to announce its inflation target and monetary policy plan at the 
beginning of the year and to provide a quarterly report to parliament on its conduct of 
monetary policy. 
Nevertheless, the road towards a credible monetary policy has not always been easy for BI. 
Conditions in Indonesia make monetary policy a complex task. The economy and the 
financial system are undergoing difficult restructuring processes. Inflation has been affected 
mostly by higher administered prices, exchange rate depreciation and heightened inflationary 
expectations. The exchange rate has been driven by the level of market confidence towards 
sociopolitical developments and the slow progress of the economic and financial 
restructuring programmes. Monetary policy has been made more difficult by the lack of a 
smooth-functioning transmission mechanism arising from problems faced by financial 
intermediaries. With these problems and challenges, Indonesia’s experience in recent years 
offers valuable lessons on how to enhance the credibility of monetary policy as well as on 
what the proper role of the central bank should be in nurturing the economic recovery. 
3.  Do the deeds of central banks correspond to their words? For instance, do 
estimates of reaction functions or other measures of the actual actions of the central 
bank correspond to what it claims to be doing? 
There are no estimates of the policy reaction function. The experience of BI using inflation 
targeting with base money as operational target is less than favourable, owing to difficulties 
in controlling base money. There are two preconditions for a successful use of base money 
as policy instrument. First, BI has the capacity to control base money with its own 
instruments. Second, public demand for base money is highly predictable, and the relation 
between base money and inflation is stable; thus targeting base money means that BI is able 
to target inflation. 
The unfavourable performance of base money control was largely attributable to the difficulty 
in predicting public behaviour towards currency holding. After the crisis, there was a 
structural shift in the public demand for currency, making it difficult to view it solely in terms of 
the transactions and precautionary motives. Base money control became more difficult under 
the fragile banking structure. Under such circumstances, raising the monetary instrument 
interest rate (SBI) to absorb currency into the banking system was often hampered by the 
low response of the deposit interest rate, so that the required interest rate increase must be 
quantitatively larger. 
This reality often posed a dilemma to BI in the implementation of monetary policy. On the 
one hand, BI had to raise the interest rate to reduce the demand for base money. On the 
other hand, the high interest rate environment exacerbated the fragility of the banking system BIS Papers No 31  221
 
 
and the corporate sector, with consequent adverse effects on the real economy. Facing such 
a dilemma, it was difficult for BI to achieve the predetermined base money target (Table 1). 
Base money control was also difficult when base money was far below the predetermined 
target, as the experience in 2002 showed. The attempt to stimulate base money growth was 
not effective when the banking sector was in a weak condition and the risks in the real sector 
were high. For as long as banks were not sound, additional economic liquidity through banks 
would just return to the central bank. Therefore, base money performance was largely 
affected more by demand conditions than by monetary policy. 
The inflation record has been far from perfect. Inflation was above the target in 2000-02 even 
though it could be maintained within the target in 2003 and 2004. For 2005 and 2006, 
inflation is forecast to be above the target. The recent inflationary pressures stem mainly 
from the increase in administered prices, depreciation of the exchange rate, and rising 
inflation expectations. BI has responded with further tightening of monetary policy since the 
third quarter of last year, accompanied by direct measures to stabilise the exchange rate and 
strengthen policy coordination with the government to mitigate the impacts of administered 
prices and prices of volatile foods. 
 
Table 1 
Monetary policy framework performance 























2000   5.0-7.0   3.0-4.0    8.30   8,238    23.40    9.53 
2001   6.0-8.5    5    11.0-12.0    10,255   18.30   12.53 
2002  9.0-10.0   3.5-4.0    14.0-15.0   9,353    9.30    10.03 
2003  8.0-10.0   3.5-4.0    13    8,593    10.30    5.06 
2004   4.5-6.5   4.0-5.0    13.0-14.5   8,940    15.14    6.40 
1  In per cent. 
 
Faced with difficulties in controlling base money, but with continued improvements in 
financial and economic conditions that are reinforced by significant progress in strengthening 
the monetary policy framework, BI is determined to take further steps to improve its monetary 
policymaking consistent with the implementation of the IT framework. The move is intended 
to strengthen the effectiveness and governance of monetary policy to achieve price stability 
under conditions of sustainable economic growth. 
Key measures of the enhanced monetary policy framework focus on four main areas: (i) the 
move from base money to the BI rate as operational target for monetary operations (policy 
instrument); (ii) enhanced decision-making process consistent with forward-looking strategy 
of directing current monetary policy response to achieve the inflation target; (iii) more 
transparent communication strategy to signal the stance of monetary policy and to guide 
private sector expectations; and (iv) strengthened policy coordination with government to 
mitigate inflationary pressures stemming from increase in administered prices and volatile 
food prices, as well as for better and concerted management of the overall economy. 222  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
4.  What provides the nominal anchor in the country? How are the issues of fiscal 
dominance and exchange rate dominance dealt with? 
The nominal anchor for monetary policy is the medium-term inflation target (based on the 
CPI) set by the government in September 2004. Based on the Ministry of Finance decree, 
the inflation targets for 2005, 2006 and 2007 are set in the ranges of 6.0% ± 1%, 5.5% ± 1% 
and 5.0% ± 1%, respectively. 
Article 56 of the BI Act prohibits BI from extending credit to the government. In the meantime, 
similar to the Philippines, indirect fiscal dominance does exist, owing to fiscal deficits and the 
large stocks of government external and domestic debt. Furthermore, the large stock of 
government domestic debt, with a coupon rate equal to the three-month SBI discount rate 
(variable rate bond), has the effect of reducing BI independence in determining the SBI 
discount rate, particularly when the monetary policy stance requires an increase in the 
interest rate. Rupiah exchange rate depreciation, given the large stock of government foreign 
debt, should also be minimised to avoid an onerous local currency debt servicing burden on 
the government. As in our commentary on the fiscal dominance issue in the Philippines, the 
current and future fiscal deficits which appear to remain heavy as measured by the large 
budget allocations for external and domestic debt services, will indirectly limit BI 
independence in monetary policy implementation. 
For an open economy such as Indonesia, the exchange rate affects inflation in a substantial 
way. For example, exchange rate depreciation raises inflation, reflecting the pass-through 
effect of higher import prices as well as expanded aggregate demand via higher net exports. 
Besides, the public monitors exchange rate movements every day, so that the behaviour of 
the exchange rate could simply be regarded as a key indicator of central bank performance. 
Furthermore, owing to the large outstanding stocks of external obligations of the Indonesian 
banking and corporate sectors, exchange rate movements have magnified effects - not only 
on inflation and export competitiveness, but also on the servicing of external debt and thus 
on the future fiscal position, which could easily lead to another currency crisis, like in Mexico 
in 1994-95 and in Asia in 1997-98. 
According to BI, the IT framework still focuses on inflation, and meeting the inflation target is 
a priority. Exchange rate movements and their determinants are closely monitored. If an 
exchange rate depreciation is the result of changing portfolios, tighter monetary policy is 
implemented to prevent higher inflation. But if the depreciation is the result of a terms-of-
trade shock, an easier monetary policy is implemented.
33 
Thus, Indonesians argue that it is difficult to include the exchange rate in the policy rule 
without reviewing the factors behind the changes in the exchange rate. In this respect, BI 
excludes the exchange rate from its monetary policy response, but regards the exchange 
rate as one variable in the information set to monitor and evaluate before decisions are made 
on the required interest rate response. 
5.  How effectively does the central bank communicate with the public? By what 
means? Do readily available reports and a website provide adequate information? 
Communication and transparency are important in Indonesia, where inflation expectations 
constitute a dominant determinant of inflation, along with the effects of administered prices, 
prices of volatile foods, and direct exchange rate pass-through. Moreover, inflation 
expectations in Indonesia have been mostly adaptive in nature, reflecting substantial inertia. 
The BI Act prescribes the mechanisms for BI to regularly convey its inflation targets and 
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policy evaluation to the public. The single target of inflation is published at the beginning of 
each year, and policy evaluation is regularly published. 
The current communication strategy and transparency are implemented in press releases, 
speeches and BI official discussions with the public and economic observers, and quarterly 
reports to the House of Representatives (DPR). There are also several publications available 
such as monthly reports, quarterly reports, annual reports, financial stability reports and 
research bulletins. 
In addition, to enhance its communication strategy, BI introduced its Monetary Policy Report 
in August 2005. This report contains an overall assessment of the quarterly Monetary Board 
meeting on recent economic and financial developments, inflation forecasts, and monetary 
policy responses required to bring inflation within target. Furthermore, BI intends to publish 
the decisions of Monetary Board meetings, its economic forecasting models, and a primer on 
monetary policy. 
The BI website http://www.bi.go.id is also available to the public. Although the website 
remains in a developmental stage, the public can access all information relating to monetary 
policy, banking supervision and regulation, and the payment system. There are future plans 
to improve the website so that it conforms to those of other central banks implementing the 
IT framework. In enhancing its communication strategy, coverage and media, BI hopes to 
guide public expectations towards the inflation target as well as improve BI credibility. 
The impact on the Philippine and Indonesian economies of the recent change in the 
exchange rate regime in China is considered to be minimal, owing to the small weight of the 
yuan in relation to the currency basket used in calculating the real effective exchange rate 
(REER). The present course of both countries’ monetary policy frameworks and their 
implementation will continue. However, with several estimates of undervaluation of the yuan 
ranging from 18% to 35% (Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004)), and should China revalue 
accordingly, it is an open question as to the impact on other countries in the region (likely 
appreciations, albeit considerably less than the Chinese appreciation). 
Impact of higher energy prices 
BI reacted only partially to the increase in inflation caused by the recent hike in fuel prices. 
The main challenge was how to contain this supply-driven inflation shock so that it would not 
result in higher inflation expectations. This proved difficult because Indonesians tended to 
raise their inflation expectations as actual inflation increased, regardless of the sources of 
inflation. The response of BI was to cautiously increase the interest rate such that it 
maintained a sound balance in the foreign exchange market. BI saw to it that the increase in 
the rates did not induce too much capital inflows (thus allowing some depreciation of the 
exchange rate), while at the same time maintaining the momentum of economic growth. BI 
also adopted a series of policy measures to curb speculative short-term capital inflows while 
tightening commercial banks’ net open positions. 
The above policy response was supported by a combination of policy measures related to 
banking regulation/prudential regulations. With the existing large liquidity overhang in the 
system, BI knew that by raising its policy rate alone it may not persuade banks to adjust their 
loan rates. Thus BI tried to soak up the liquidity from the banking system by adopting higher 
reserve requirements.
34 
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These measures seem to be working. Although inflation is still very high at 16-17% per year, 
BI projects that it should fall to to single digit levels by the end of 2005 (partly because the 
one-time upward effect on the CPI would die out in October). The market believes this as BI 
continues to adopt a tight policy stance. Currently, with the BI rate at 12.75%, BI has 
observed an influx of short-term capital, which has tended to appreciate the exchange rate. 
This in turn should help reduce inflationary expectations in the economy. 
Fiscal dominance and other issues 
Much like in the Philippines, the large stocks of total (domestic and external) government 
debt in Indonesia make fiscal dominance an issue, despite outright prohibition of BI credits to 
the government (a stricter legal condition than in the Philippines). 
Besides, there are unfavourable institutional and other issues. First, as Alamsyah et al (2001, 
p 327) admit, “BI feels unable totally to ignore pressures from outside - for example, urging it 
to avoid raising interest rates too far”. The BI budget is discussed and approved by 
parliament. The Governor and Deputy Governor have to be confirmed by parliament. These 
institutional procedures may at times hamper the ability of BI to pursue an independent 
monetary policy and select its own reaction coefficients in its policy rule (eg the relative 
weights of the inflation vs output gaps). Second, working models for forecasting inflation 
remain in their infancy and “conclusive studies of the costs and benefits of choosing certain 
channels (the short-term interest rate) in preference to others still need to be undertaken in 
order to decide on the optimal operational (policy) instrument” (Alamsyah (2001), p 328, 
parentheses ours). Third, there is confusion over monetary instruments. BI handles both its 
own instrument (SBI) and that of the government (bonds). Fourth, there may still be a need 
for instilling consistent monetary discipline, disclosure and transparency. And finally, fully-
fledged IT may have to wait until bank restructuring is fully completed and the banking 
system’s intermediary function fully restored. 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper has reviewed the monetary policy approaches and implementation in the 
Philippines and Indonesia. We addressed several issues relating to the objectives/ 
intermediate targets/instruments, how these are determined, central bank independence, the 
nominal anchor, fiscal dominance and other issues, and communication strategy and 
transparency. 
Fiscal dominance remains an unresolved issue in both the Philippines and Indonesia. In the 
absence of fiscal discipline, an independent central bank such as the BSP cannot guarantee 
a stable nominal anchor. For the BSP to successfully focus on price stability (and exchange 
rate stability), there must be a credible commitment by the national government to reduce 
fiscal deficits and ultimately to achieve fiscal surpluses. The Indonesian case is even more 
unfavourable. Besides outside pressure on BI, the large stocks of domestic and external debt 
of the government exert relentless pressure on the exchange rate and, since the exchange 
rate figures prominently in price level determination, BI cannot guarantee a stable nominal 
anchor either. 
The other issue relates to the health of the banking system. Here, the Philippines fares better 
than Indonesia. Nevertheless, interest rate actions could have perverse effects on inflation 
and output when non-performing loans are high and the practice of risk management has yet 
to take root in commercial banking and in bank oversight. 
Since expectations are crucial in the monetary policy transmission mechanism, 
the elimination of fiscal deficits and a substantial reduction in the stocks of government debt 
are critical to influencing the private sector’s expectations. BIS Papers No 31  225
 
 
We conclude that the top policy priority for both the Philippines and Indonesia is to implement 
without delay fiscal and financial sector reforms.
35 Without such reforms, monetary policy can 
only do so much, and these two countries may find that their apparent successes in inflation 
targeting were a mirage. 
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